University of Central Florida

STARS
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements
1-1-1962

Economic impacts of disarmament
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact
STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Economic impacts of disarmament" (1962).
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements. 189.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/189

ECONOMIC
IMPACTS
OF
DISARM AM ENT

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL

AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

A REPORT
OF THE PANEL ON ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
DISARMAMENT
Submitted to
THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGIWCY

MEMBERS OF THE PANEL:

EAII~EBENOIT,
Chairman; Associate Professor of International Businens,
Columbia University, and Director, R e a r c h Program on Economic
Adjustments to Disarmament, New York, N.Y.

BLANCHE
B~NSTEIN
Bureau
,
of International Organization Affaim, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
PREWTICE
N. DEAN,Chief, Foreign Economic Policy Division, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (TSA), D e p a ~ e n otf Defense,
Washingtun, D.C.
MARVINHOFFENBERG,
Military Economics and Costing Division, Rcaearch Analysis Corp., Betheda, Md.
RICHAIU)R.NEWON,
COuncil of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C.
ROBERTM. SOLOW,Council of Economic Advisers, Waehingmn, D.C.
ROBERTF. STEADMAN,
Economic Adjustment Adviser, OEce of tbc .
Asdstant Secretary of Defense (I&L), Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.
MURUT L. WIS~ENBAUM,Corporate Economist, The Boeing Co.,
Seattle, Wash.
NATWEINBERG,
Dilector of Special Projects and Economic Analpis,
United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, Detroit, Mich.

ALEXANDER
F. KIEFER,
Rappomr; United States Arms Contro1 and
Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.
ARTHUR FURNIA,Extc~tiveO f i m of t
h Panel; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.

FOREWORD
This report was prepwed by a panel of experts under the chairmanship of Iprof~ag~r
Emile Benoit of Columbia University, at the request
of John 3. McCloy while he waa Advihler to the President on Diaarmament. It was completed and submitted to the United Statea
Brms Control and Disarmament Agency afbr the latter had been
created by Congress aa the summer agency to the Disrrrmament
Administration of the Departmant of State.
The act eetshhhing the Arms Control end &armament Agency
s p d c a l l y directs the Agency to eonduct research and develop etudim
regarding "the w n o ~ n i c
~
~
u of earms ncontrol
~ and
dismament, including the problems of madjmtmente arising ia
industry and the reallocation of nstiond ~ U P C B B . ' ' The report by
the Panel on the &onornic Impacts of Disarmament is a first significant development in this area of responsibility,
I believe the rcpoFt will be of broad interest. The panel of experts,
who served in their individual cspacitiea, was drawn h m the U.S.
Government, from industry, from labor, and from the academic
community. They have examined the problem of the economic hpact of disarmament on the b&
of a disarmament model devised by
them. They conclude that, while the economic problem which may
be expected in the event of disarmament are by no maaas insuparable,
these problem do require the devdopment of seneible adjutmaat
policies and vigorous government lerrdmbip for solution. They aho
point out that the impact of diaarmhment would ody accentuate
structural problem which already exist aa the mdt of technological
advance and other developments in our economy and that, if these
pmblare overcome, achievernant of major nationd goah will bs
greatly facilitat-d by the use of the humen and physical reaourcss
released from the defense program.
I believe the report will cantribute to a better undemtsnding of the
implications of disarmament for the economy, and I hope that its
publieation will etimulate further ~tudyand d i t w i o n of this vita1
sspect of disarmament.
The opinions and conclusions presented in this report am, of mum,
t h m of the panel and do not ne~~s9sriIy
repment the vie- of this
Agency or any other sgency of the United States C3avernment.

...

WILLKAM
C. FOSTER,
Dir&
Unitd States h 8 Control
and Disarmment Agenay
WA~RINGTON,
D.C., Jam-
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TRANSMITTAL LEWER
To THE HOMORABLTC
WILLIAMC. F o s ~ ~ n :
I am pleased to trans~nitllerewith tho report of the Panel
on Economic Xmpaot~of Disarmament based on extensive diacmsiona of our panel dnca laet June, and utilizing r e w m h
mnducted by the Program of b a r c h on Ehnomio Adjustmente t o Dhrmament, of which I have been the Direator.
It iB my understanding thet the report is accepted as to ita
brosd emphwis and mnolueions by all members of the panel,
although individual membem mkht have some reservations
with respect to partiaular aanertions, emphasis, or treatment.
It is understood, moreover, that alI pand membem subscribsd
to this report only in their individual capacities hnd without
commitment as to the Government agencies or other organimtiom t o which they may belong.
T h e report seeks to s u m m the
~ vltrious murw of concern
within the country as to p i b l e emnomic daculties arising
from general and complete dismmament, to project the net
reductions in defense expenditure (after vsrioue ogsets), and to
appraiw the likely economic impact under variow wumptions
with respect to adjustment polioies.
Respectfully eubmitted,

Erma BENOIT
Chhan

Report of the
Panel on Economic Impacts of Disarmament
Threats to national security now require an improvement in U.S.
miIitary capabilitiw. It is important at tbis time to emphasize that
tbe U.S. Government in no way abandons ib goal of general and
controlled diarmamenh under international law with international
security maintained by a strong international peacekeeping authority.
The United States has not relinquished the hope that, when it is
made sufficiently clear that aggression or threab no longer promise
to achieve any useful result, the gmund wilt be laid for an acceptance
by all nations of a genuine disarmament agreement in the above
s e w in the intereat of avoiding the grave dangers and heavy burdena
of modern armaments.
The conclusion of a satisfactory disarmament agreement would
create serious apprehensions about the potential economic impact.
While the Soviet Government has recently c a n d a d that the United
States snd other Western nations could disarm without major or
permanent ilI effect to their economies, this is by no means obvious
to public opinion generally, either abroad or at home. There &ta
a widespread and understandable fear, especially on the part of
defense industries and workers in thew industri~and in the m e d
forces, of the economic disruptions connected with a disarmament
agreement.
To dispel misconceived or exaggerated apprehensions, aa well a9
to help develop appropriate policiw for handling the genuine problems
involved, it now seems appropriate that the U.S. Government undertake a serious and objective study as to the extent to which a digarmament program might have adveme effects and the measures
which might be raquired to avoid or soften unfavorable economic

impacte.
A task force of economic experts drawn from the universities,
Government, business, and the labor unions has, therefore, been
assernbled to make a preliminary report on this subject. I& purpose

hss bean to datemine the chief elementa in the problem, to collect
and aurnrnwiza the mdts of pmvioua mearch in thia generd area,
and to eat forth tentative conclusions on the bash of the preliminary
and partial evidence 80 far available.
The broad oondusions of the panel put in a very sulnrnnr;\- Imln
nre as foUa+:
(a) That disarmament of the type, and at the pace whi& the
pand considem to be implied by the United Stat= Program for .
General and Complete Disarmament in a Pemfui World, submitted
to the United Netions on September 25, 196l-after allowance for
pmpamd expansion in National Amnautiw and Space Administration
(NASA) and civilian Atomic Energy CommiAon ( m C ) programs
and the requirements of disarmament inspection and international
peace e n f o r c e m e n ~ o d dm a t e small danger of provoking immediate depression in our economy, aasurning sensible adjustment
policies and vigorom Govement leadership to dispel adveme elTects
on business and consumer anticipations and to provide remursnce
that w e g a t e demand will not be dowed to decline precipitantly;
(b) That a steady decline in dafenm spending spread over several
years may prow a significant drag on the economy md pose seriou~
problems for policpakers. T h m problems can be mastered by the
application of appropriate policies, the chief obstacle9 to which
would be political r&st.ance rather than deficiencim in our econoinic

knowledge ;
(c) That structural problems in particular induatrim or a m are
unavoidable and eould be serious for the individuale, companies, and
communitia prominently affected;
(d) That the alleviation of these structural difficulties may require
a variety of adjustment programs, aome providing mistance for the
retraining, temporary support, and relocation of individuals and
reconversion and diversification of enterpriees, some promoting the
importation of new indwtries into areas hard hit by the closing of
defense planta and installations, and some, perhaps, seeking new
publicly suppord uaa of national importance for part of our existing
defema resources, particularly our capabilities in research and
development;
(e) That included in the latter category might be research and
development progra~naon twhnological bottIenecks impeding intarnational economic devdopment, which could also make a significant
contribution to one of our major f o w policy objectives;

(f) That the impact of diar~namentwould only accentuate s t r u e

turd problems which dmdy exkt and which will have ta be solved
myhow if the nation f ta produce up to ite E
d pobntiditim;
(g) That if these probjerna are overcome, achiavernent of major
national goals win. be greatly fncilibted by the uae of the humm a d
msteFial resources demed from the defense program;
(h) That within wide limits the Nation am d o r d to have as high
or as Iow a level of defenae expenditure asis deemed pohtidy d h b l e
and should feel no consbsint on the economic side in adjusting defense
expenditures to whatever level seems beat to accord with our politid
objectivee. However, advance planning by Qovernment at dl lev&
and by bueiness firms, labor uniom, and- other private orgmiaetiom
is required if the economy is to adjust smoothly to eignificant c-8~
in the level of defense spending, particularly auch as would wult from
gene&

and complete disarmament.

The Problem
The chief pubIic canabout the egects of disarmament ia the
poadbility thtlt it might create a sudden and severe decline in emnomic
activity, i.e. depression. Another danger, of a l w dramatic but
possibly more realistic character, is that a sustained decline in defense
expenditurea could impair the long-term stability and growth of our
economy. Another obvious and unavoidable problem is that certain
companies, industries, workere, and cummunitiea that are heaviiy
involved in defenw activiti~may face serious structural readjustment
problems even if overall demand can be kept high and no general
decline occurs. Shifting people and resources b new us- takes time
and may well create considerable hardship for the parts of the economy
that have to make the shifts.
The reasons for concern can be eet forth briefly. The defense
program a h r h nearly a tenth of the total U.S. production of goods
and servicas and emplop, directly and indirectly, a like percentage
of the labor force. (This is inclusive of personnel in the Armed Form
and in the Defense Department.)
In some industries the dependence on defeme employment is
wpecially high. Approximately 95 percent of the employment in
aircraft and missilea, 60 percent in ship and boatbuilding, and 40
percent of the ernploment in radio and communications equipment
is dependent on defense expenditure^. On the other hand only 0
The t a b h referred to below el.e carried at the end of the report.
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percent of empIoyment in hamportation, 2 percent in construction,
and leas t h n 1%percent in t.r%deand sefyim is similarly dependent
on the defense <rogram ; and much of this dependen& is ikdirect.
(See Table I.)
In some areas of the country the dependence on defense production
is already very tangible and a serious source of concern. For example, in 19b9 missile and aircraft production provided at least 82
percent of the manufacturing employment in San Diego, 72 percent
in Wichita, 53 percent in Seattle, and 27 percent in tho h Angel*
b n g Beach area. Certsin States are d e ~ r l ysubject to dimproportionately hwvy economic impaeta becpuae of the relatively heavy
dependence of their manufacturing an 'major items of procurement,
Table PI shows 14 States with above-average dependence on major
procurement for their employment, and 9 additional States with
exceptionally heavy dependence on Department of Defense (DOD)
paSrnllsto sustain their income. Kansas, Waahingtan, New Mexico,
California, and Connecticut appear as the cases of most severe relative
dependence on defense manufacturing, with 20 to 30 percent of their
manufacturing employment in major procurement ; Alaska, Hawaii,
District of Columbia, and Virginia have the heaviest dependence on
DOD payrolls, with 10 to 20 percent of their income supplied by
military pay and allowances or civilian wages and salaries. It is
disquieting to note that s m e d of the States with hmvy dependsnw
on major procurement for employment are aIso well above the average for dependence of income on Department of Defenee payrolls.
This is notably true for New Mexico and Utah, but it is also true to
eome extent for Kansas, Wmhington, and California.
Moreover, it appeara that def~aseexpenditure are particularly

important in precisely those industriw, notably the electronics and
aerospace industries, that have shown the mmt rapid pattern of
growth and technological innovation and provided a large share of
the support for rmesrch and development. The def enss program now
f i n a n c ~about half of all industrid rwearch and development and
one-fourth of all pure research.
The projected earnings of firms heady engaged in the defense
program have been very highly capit.dized in the stock market, and
the present level of their common stock value would appear to ba
quite vulnerable in the event of any major reduction in defetls~
expenditures.
Moreover, the industrid character of the defense program hw been
changing in W S , ~that may intensify the probla~rlof adjustment in
major defense cutbacks. By contrwt wit11 the situation during

I
I

m

World Hfar 11, ud evwl the Kor~anWar, a larger share of defenee
industry today is in the hauds of highly spmializd defense contractom
whoas products hear little resemblance ta any civilian items, who have
limited mperience ouhide of defense production, who h ~ v enever
"wt~verted"from civilian production, and for whom entry into production of civilinti end-item would t y p i d y involve not so rnuch
"reconversion" as radical divemZcation. Their attempta to date to
get into civilian lines of production have been frequently unprofitable,
Some people aIso fear, rightly or wrongly, that our economy has
suffered certain changes since the 1945-53 period rss r@
both
structure and demand and that them changee might make it more
sensitive to deflationary stimuli and I- capable of eusy and automatic
readjustment to cutbbcks in defense demand.

la attempting to project the mnotnk impact of diearmamant, it
is h t of dl n
v to have a mwont~blyh + u t set of assumptions about the nrrture and timing of the disarmament proass.
While thesemattms are and wiIl continue to be the aubject of negotiation, the ultimata outcome of which cm hardly be prediated st this
stage, it is nonethelaw newsmy to make wumptions about the
g e n d character of the disermammt p r o m with respect at Iewt
to thoee factors t h t wjjl have a decided economic impact.
The disarmament assumptions we d in making our projwtions
are intended to be generally consistent with the major U.S. disarm
, ment objectivm and policim as set forth in the proporala p m e n t d
by the President to the United Nations. The model was, however,
d-ed
by the panel. The timing and phof &armament used
in the model are, in the judgment of the penel, the optimum that a n
realistically be expected from the nagotktion md impIementation
of general and complete &armament in view of the fundamenbd
and complex factors invoIved and in vim of the negotiating history
of recent yeare. However, the spmXc m m m and dam aseumsd
in the model involve matupon which determinations of US.
policy have not yet been made.
With a different concept or model of karmament, the aconornic
implications might be considarably altered. For example, an a r m s
control agmmmt involving a major change in the weapozu9 mix might
involve so reduction in defame expenditure and, b e c a w of the heavy
new inspection cosb, might even make for mme net inoraase in mili-

-

b y budge&at l w t tor a tine. Similarly, a crash disarmament
program, such as might arise out of a crisis situstion described by
T. C , SafialIing under the heading "Reciproqd Fear of Su~priae
Attack," or a region-by-region sequential disarmament pattern aa
suggreetec! by Lo& Soh, would considerably change the economic
impat. Such more remob dtsmativea have been ig~~ored
here, to
mncantmte on the e b l e implications of mom conventional conceptions of diearmament.
Even within such a conception, some of the elemate are monomia l l y more strategic than others. Any important changm made wikh
respect to t h m dementa during the mume of negotiation of 8 dhm.wnent agreement could, in m e degree, undermine the projections and d y m of this report.
One crucial assumption in this mnse ie with respect to the dste of
the cutof€ in new production of delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads, Another is the pwe of dernobjlization of personnel. Another
is the magnitude m d type of inspection, police, and detarrent forcea
astabhhed under &n international control organization (or, as the
Sephmber 25 plsn Gslla it, I.D.0.-International Diearmament
Orghation) and mponaible for administering and enforcing the
disarmament agreement. The rate and timing of the buildup of such
form~is likewise very important. (It hould ba notd that the cast
of the inspection service is a particuIarly uncertain item, with a very
wide dispemion of estimates among experta with respect to the type
and amount of impaction activities and equipment and even with
respect to the probable msta of particular inspection systems.)
Another assumption af obvious importance is with mpect to the total
duration of the disarmament program. Findy, the projected severity of the disarmament impact will & be affectad by the assumptione
with reape& to the size of the national forces at the beginning of tlie
program and after diearmament is completed.
Our model is in line with informal aetinitrtes of 1965 defense expendituree ae f a n g withii the range of $50 b $60 billion. We have
used the upper end of thia range in order to reduce the likelihood that
our projections of dimernmen t impacts would underestimate the
axtent of the problem. With respect b othor mnomically st.rategic
assumptions mentioned above we have sought to choose those wumptime which mem nlmt in line 6 t h the oBcial disarmament prop04
hnd bava checked the quantitative estimates with the opinion of
experte wherever possible-adopting compromise figures wherever
the range of expert opinion waa i t d f very wide.

The disarl~lelnentrt~oddadopted by the panel for the puqmm of
tlris report., rand ib i~~~plicntions
for U.S. security expendituresnatianal and in tmational-me shown in Table UX , In approximate
terms, it projects a decline in defenae expenditure of $17 billion (I 080
dollars) in the fiwt 3 years, a further d d i n e in national defense programs in the second stage of $12 billion partly offaet by a $3.5 billion
contribution to international inspection costa, and so forth (i.e., a
net duction of a b u t $8.5 billion), and a further net reduotion in the
third (two-phase) stage of $1 3.5 billion in the laat 6 yearn. The total
net reduction in U.S. security expenditurn (after dlowmce for the
U.S.contribution to the costa of an international organizetion responsible for inspection, police, and detment functions) would thus be
about $38.5 billion over a 12-year period, with roughly $6 billion a
year in the initid 3-year period.
Thae cutbacks might be partly offset by a buildup in c d u h
programs which have baen closely d a t e d with our defense e#mt
in the past, such ss the NASA and the
AEC prognuno. The
pqaectionswith respect to these programs ahown in Table III include
an allowsnm for the NASA moan program m t l y announced,
projections prove +tic,
the offwh
e t cetera. If the re*
provided by the expaasion of both "nsmciated progrrune" together
would be cl-e to a total of $2.5 billion over the initial 3-year period
of meximum defense cutbacks, The total expansion of these progrsms
over the whole disarmament program is estimated at $6.8 billion, based
on existing plans. If thae progrntns are accelemted between now and
1965, this could mdt in a slower pace of buildup between 1065 and
1977 than m u m d in our model but would more likely be wocisted
with a companding incresse in the aim of the 1977 program so that
the projected increase between 1965 and 1077 might not be mtly
changed. Our projection^, incidentally, do md involve additional
e p w programs which might be ndopted a9 ~ p & c diaarmammt
oiTaeta*
If we take account of the d ~ provided
t
by the cmb of bpection
forces and the buildup of the NASA and civilian AEC pro@-,
we
find a net reduction in U.S. security and d a t e d expendituree of
abut $22 billion in the h t 6 years, with only about $5 billion a year
during the cmual introductory 3-yew pesiod of mardmurn impact.

~~

The Fear of Depression

'

The chief popular economic fear of disarmament i that i t might
suddenly bad to a severe depression, Thii seeme to us a rather improbable contingency, wuming the relatively slow pace of the aukas set forth herein and the strong likelihood of eome offsetting policies.
A net reduction of defen'ee a x p e n d i t u ~of only about $5 billion a year,
or lew than 1 percent of the gmas national product, oven in the initial
period of maximum impat, would be a far smaller percenae of the
GNP than waa represented by the post World War II and post-Korean
defense cuta, whi& for a time were, respectively, 30 percent and 3
percent of GNP.
It would, of course, be pwible in the absence of further mtnpensatory sction for an initial deflationary net impact of even $5 billion a
year to cause a erioua slowdown, via the action of tbe multiplier.
Under these conditions, the reduction in defense spending would be
reflected in reduced inaolnes for employees of the defense industries
and of the industries supplving, directly and indirecdy, the defense
contractors. Profits {after taxes) in t.heae industriw mould & be
reduced, and this almost cortllinly would be reflected in some cutbank
in dividends. Declines in personal incornea would be mitigated by
reduced taxw ttnd increased transfer payments, but, given exiding
laws, a dollar reduction in dofensc spending would cause a fall in
disposable income Ieading to a b u t a dollar reduction in persond
consumption. In addition, the decline in aggregate demand would
lead to a reduction in capacity and inventory requirement8 and thus
to some fdhff in investlnent, As a result, a $5 billion y e d y cutback
in defense spending might well generate a tot$ decline of aggregate
demand of between $10 billion and $12 billion a year, if m~npensating
policies were not brought in b play.
Yet it is hard to believe that we would stand by idly and let the
nlultiplier have ib full impuct by failing to take sarne further compensatory action. Public pr-ures would be strong to reduce twes
and to permit the expansion of some high priority nondefense Govern~tlentprogratns that are being kept on ice durillg the period of lmvy
defense: budgets. It seems unlikely that wa woulrl repeat tho ~nistt~ke
made in 1853-54 when F d m d nondefense e.xpcnditure-9 were cut by
ovor $2 billion at the very ti~neth& heavy cuts were being made i t t
defense. (It should be noted, moreover, that tax cuts and relaxtition
or rnonetury policy in 1954 prevanted the GNP fmru declining as intrch
as ~nilitwyspending, i,e., in effect, the multiplier effects were lrloro
than off~et.)

Perhaps the chief danger of a precipitmt decline would be psychologicat. We would be Iacing an extended
of futurn defense cuts
over more than a decade ahead. We have never hed a situation erractly pardel to this in our history, and we cannot be sure just how
this wodd affect businem and consumer anticipations and expenditure
plans. Pmsimism might be heightened by 8 major break in ~tock
market prices, which, aa indicated above, would be likely to occur at
such a time.
A great d d might depend on whether the Government could pmvide s a c i e n t reussuranee by demonstrating that a definite program
of offsets had baen readied and would be promptly implemented.
In this connection, people's expectations would be mnsidembly affected by their experience in the years prior to disarmament. If public policy hsd a c c e d e d in reducing m d v e unemployment and
restoring a rapid rate of growth, the economy could more readily
abaorb deftationary impacB without serious hurt, and ooddence in
he Government's power ta protect pmperity would be higher. On
the whole, it is our judgment that a h r p letdown during disarmament mrndna unlikely and should be &voidableif the Government
exercbm a modicum of economic sense, foresight, and courageous

leademhip.

Long-Term Adequacy of Demand
Dealing effectively with the year-by-yew declines in defenae expenditure may be much more djfEcult. It w i l l be a problem to
maintain suficient aggregate demand to utilize the m u r o e s being
released year d t e r year by the dsfenae program as well m the rapid
expamion of our industrid potential. In prsrticul~,we appear to
be in for a period of exceptionally rapid growth in the labor force, and
some authorities believe we may also be on the threahhold of a period
of exceptionally rapid productivity advances. Yet failm to find
constructive use for our growing reaourcea might be apecidly dmgerous in a postdisarmament situation because the international
rivalry between the free end regimenkd societies might centm to an
cvea larger extent than at present on their respective economic performances and their ab'dity to supply aid and leaderehip in internt~tiondeconomic developrnent. Certainly a continuing and g~owing
burden of excess une~nploymentand a marked failure to mtam a
rapid growth of industrial output could graveiy affect our international prestige ILS well as impair our domestic morale.

Some ramstmnce may be found in the dative s u m of the
dermobiliaation experience after World Wrrr I1 and dter Korea. Yet
these expdmcea (especially the former) m m d undar conditions
dciently different from thorre prevailing now, or +bly
prevailing
&tthe time of 8 future &armament, that their relevance is open to
queetion. Nor were theee
BD unqufiedly autbst
B repetition would f d y meet our requiremenb in the k t i e s .
The Gtuation in 1946 was one of hyperliquidity and repreesed
idation, based eaeentidly on $265 billion of wartime deficit hmcing
in conjunction with war-imposed shorhgea. This had contribut&
to an abnomd rise in saving^ md coneumer liquidity during the war
y m . The asvings rate roae to over 26 percant in 1944, and total
personal savings accumulabd during the war yeam totaled over $160
billion. With the &srp d&e in f i e rste of wvhgs after the war
(it fell ta the k h l y abnormal low of 2.8 v n t ) and with a rapid
rise of consumer debt (from the very low level of 4.5 percent of di%
pmable personal income), there was tr tripling of expenditurea on
consumer durabIes and a tenfold increase in nonfarm midentid
construction between 1944 and 1948. In m n t yeam conaurner debt
hae been running at around IS percmt of diepoeable income m d the
eavings ratio has &own great stability at levels between 0 and 8 percent. There is h p l y nothing in our recent experience suggmting
that a u ~comparable jump in comumer expenditure h a n d out of
savings or consumer debt is in the c a d in the event of defense cutb a h . (This does wt imply, of mume, that consumer e ~ p e n d i t m
will not increme rapidly if dispaeable income is raisgd fast enough0
Moreover, while ths 1945-48 reconversion was mmplished with
an unexpectdy low rate of unemployment, it did involve harp
declinca in the total labor force, hours of work, land industrial output.
Thme reductions were a reaction to the rebation of the unusual
m o m i c p m u r e of the mnr years. In a paamtime situation in the
1960'8 such a decline in the supply of labor is to be neither expwted
uor welcomed.
The pt-Korean demobfiation, set @mt ~moptimistic background of full employment, recant inflationary price trends (in 19Sl),
rapidly rising equity value43 in homes, and a stiD fairly low level of
consumer debt, was not without mme ~u~
wpecthl. With
the d&e
of about one-third in thr red U.S. defense c:penditurw
from 1953 to 1960, industrid output (which had risen 54 percent from
1946 to 1963) m e only 18 percent from 1953 to 1960. The $6.7
billion caeh surplu~in 1956 and 1967 WM asso&td with a marked
decline in the growth rats and a subshatid increwe in the year-in-

ywrr-out rate of unemployment. These remarka, of course, do not
imply that the U.S. economy requirm rising defmse expenditura to

pmper. They do s-t,
on the other hand, that fdure to nupply
adequate offmta for d a f m cuts may m
i w severe rastrictione on the

attainable rate of growth.
Popular beliefa and attitudm reapbnaibIa for our failure to provide
adequate offsets to d e f e n ~cuh in the past may well contiriue to give
UE some trouble in the future. One BU& attitude is the fesr of idstion, which may rwult in deliberate &or&- to restrain incraw in
demend lest too grmt opportunities be thereby afforded for p d u m r
elements ta r&e coats. Another relevant attitude ie an antipathy to
budget deficits and national debt and a conviction that at even a
rndw6hly high level of employment, and before full employmaat and
repid growth have been reskumi, we should consider o w d v e a morally
obligated to try to achieve a budget surplus for reduotiom in the
national debt.
There is at least some evidenca that attitudee of this sort might
larrd to attempts to reduce the national debt during a pemod of major
defcutbacks. A recent s w a y conducted by the U n i v d t y of
Michigan Survey Research Center, on behalf of the R e s d Program
on h n o m i c Adjustmmb to Dkrmament, found a strong public
attitude fav*
the use of defense mvinga for national debt reduction,
wibh 20 percent of the ralpndenta choosing it aa the beat use for such
savings and mother 15 percent naming it as their eetlond choice.
Thie ma of defense savings WFIS far more popdm than an expanded
foreign aid p w a m and just as popular as a reduction in income tax=.
Respondents with mllege education were pnrtidarly strong for debt
reduction,
It may be assumed that such sttampte to obtain a surplus for debt
reduction would have a deftationsrg &ect even though aome offset
might be provided by the lrotual me of the surplm to reduce the
national debt, if the rmulting increaae in investor liquidity and expan&on of bank r-ee
would facilitate private borrowing and inveatment. Except under unuauaI S ~ t i o n n r ywnditiom the net effect of
obtaining the surplus together with using it to reduce the national
debt would, however, be dearly deflationary.
Even if adequate o&t memura we.approved there xnay be institutional difficulties in having them implemantd quickly enough
to neutr&e the effect of the cutbwh. In thb mnnection it
important to note that the economy responde sharply not ody W

Wimw t& j k e aqamditzw8g, but a h to & c l h $m &fmeo d r s . 4
TOdo the moat good theretore, ofbtting meas- should, if possible,
be initiated, at the very time &at defenae contmcta are c a n d d and
before defense e x p e n d i t m n o t to speak of actual production and
employment-begin to drop. The complex and elow-moving machinery of Congrm, and its need tb mnsider masfrom the pint
of view of regional and hcd int-ts,
would appear to make m y
such anticipabry response mcdt or immssible. Much depends on
congressional w i h g n ~to~grant
~
the executive branch adequab
dhmetionary authority to accomplish nuch an objective, e.g., in the
form of ~tandbypublic works or h x reduction b i to be implemented
only under conditions specSed by the Congress in advance, or in
b m d wngreasiond authorization to the Raeident b make limited
changes in certain tsx rates for stabilization purpo8es as propod in
the recent report of the Conmidon on Money and Credit.
A heavy emphasis on tm cuts as a stabilizing measure may enmunter additional di&cultiea. Subtwtial tax cub Will mise fund&
mental questions of tax equitv ss betweon v h o w dawea of taxpayers and complex quwtiona of tax eEciency and the need for tm
reform. AB a mnlt, it may prove di&cult or importeible to time
tax cuts m as to provide a s~f~ciently
prompt and adequate o&t to
defense cub. Furthermore, owing to the operation of the ''balanced
budget multiplier," a reduction in Govehment expenditure, even if
exactly matched by a decline in taxes actually couected, will not provide quite as much of a stimulus tO the economy as i lost by the
d e c h in public expenditure? To provide adequate o h t e , therefore,
tax reductions would have to be even greater than the net reductiow
in Government expenditure, raising the politically sensitive imue of
delibarate deficit financing, and possibb encountering the troublesome obtacle of the national debt ceiling.

* Thw in 1953, btween the second and fourth qu&em them waa a dsDUne of
$2.8 billion in defense obliptions for hard goo&, with an w t d drop of
1 . 7 billton in now orders rewived by the dursble goode indmtrie~and r 4.3
percent d&e in induetrid produotion. Y e t actual defenae expijndittuw in tha
fourth quarter were only about half a W o n lower tban hi the m n d q&Apin in 1967, between tb &at and third quarters there wan s $1.6 billion dealbe
in defense obligations for hard goods, with $5.6 billion decline in new orders
rewived by the durable goods iudmtriw. By the laat quadm of tbe y w , inb W proddon had drop@ & by 5.9 pement deepite the fact that the dollar
value of national defense e*penditw had been rising and wan a W mnnlng
aligbtly ahead of fbe 0mt quarter.
a %Is fundamentally due fo the faot that a portion of the inereaaed dhpmbble
borne will not Immediately be tmdated in* higher apenditure.

A second kind of diEou2ty that might arise if the o h t a to defem
mainly in the form of tax cub is related to the p d b l e
didvrmtagm of functioning with a prmauahly d
m public
mctor in the emnomy--at least d
m relatively to total ONP. It
is g e n d y agreed that the g~eatlyenlwged pubh wtor simx
World War IT, d t i n g from heavy defame expendit-,
has pmvided additional protection agaimt d a p d o n s , ehca this m t o r is
not mpomive to contraction in the private &r
and pmvidea a
sort of b d e r or balm- w h d in the amnomy. The high tax rate
requiwd by this high level of Qov~~nmmt
eqendibww pmvidea 8
large volume of menu9 which iEl very ~ n s i t i v eto ohmgp in income,
so that ahocka to the economy are in good part abaorhd in d&em
in tax= rather than in
incame. A reduction in the &e
of the public m c h would
~
weaken this type of protection.
The above long mtalog of m b l e diflicultietr which may be encountered in maintaining adequah aggregate demand for rspid
growth in the dbmmament period is not intended to imply that we
a;re faced with any fstsl inevitability in thia respect. h is dearly
implied in our description of the problems to be enmnntared, the
eseential ewnomia of the Gtuation do not create the difl6cultim eo
much as do the institutional and attitudind limitations of an eaamtially politid chsracbr. It follows that, with a r a c i e n t w i l h g n to
~ ~ ~
embark on new offsettingnondefense progrruns d / o r to cantemplate
drsstic tax reductions to the fuU extent nmaaarjr to o h t defenw
cute and without regard to budget balancing or national debt redua
tion objectivm, there need be no mbstantial problem in maintaining
any level of demand required to employ our expanding resofor
civilian production. We have, indeed, a comidersble degree of choice
as to just how we wish t~ do it.
It ia hgMy d&able that the Oovernment prepare well in advmce
detailed measures for disarmament adjuetment, so that they ahodd
be available in time and ao that they ahodd be of a cham~ktrwhich
promotes our long-range objectives. This will permit ua to take
advantage of the great opportunities which dhmament will aord
lor the improved allomtion of our mmxs and wiH help to prevent
our rasdjuatment mewbaulg too much influenced by mnsiderstions of expedienay and by short-run politid p ~ ~ g ~ wIn
a .this
context the potentidties for expanded and improved program^ in
the fields of education snd march, transportation, urban renewal,
public health, et cetern, should be carefully explored, as well aa t h m
of tax reductions, cuntributing not ody to an oxpadon of printe
demand but dm to a strengthening of private invmtment incentives
cuta were

and muroee. Advance disctuxion of suah messuree would be helpful
in preparing s bet* informed public opinion, neither unduly f e d u l
of disermrunmt adjustments nor mmplacent to the point of denying
the need for advance prepmatiom for handling h e p r o b l ~ mthat
~ will
a r b . Such &ion
mill alsO make dear the fact that we do have
important alternatives in the way the problem ia handled and that
various pomible combinations of adjwment programs which might
su5c-e to promote a mooth adjustment may have quite different
long-run affects on our future growth rates and the apscity of the
pddharmamen t economy t o meet our broader long-tern objeetivea.
The major problem of policy p h n i q would IM to choose a policy
which, h t , ia suflieient to prevent aeriws unemploymant and B
X
capacity and, m n d , will guide the hbor and reaourma freed by
disarmmemt to w h m the n&
sre determined to be great&.
There is a wide range of fiaetrl and monetary policiee which have a
comparable impat on aggregate demand but d8-t
efFecta on the
composition of output and on the docation of remurcm among
competing needs. The balance m h c k between tax reduction and
incraaaed Qovernment spending will be governed by the relative
importance eccurded to private demand for auch g d a and sawicea
rn food, clothing, housing, rw~eaGon,health, higher eduation,
m&e
tools, mwrch, and developmenbas againat public demand
for school mnstruction, h a h a training, mds, spaw exploration,
urban r e n d , area rdeveloprneut, public hedth, and socid awvicea,
et a k a . Policy will also have to etrlke the appropriate balance
b e t w m those m w w a that =tidy preaent wsnb and tho^ that
promote the long-tarm dynamic growth of the economy.
It IJ130 W O U Ibe
~ m b l e , at I w t in theory, to "take up the slack"
by b h g h g about a reduction in working h o w , an inmeme in the
length of vacations, a reduction in the average age of retirement,
e riae in the average age at which young people start looking for jobs,
and a reduction in the proportion of women aeeldng jobs. I t b not
claw ta what egtent Qovmment policy can mdily influence wme of
thee choices, nor how much mistance such policies would enwuntm.'
Since euch policim, if dative, would facilitate the Soviet objective of
utching . up with U.S. indust&l output, their international implieutiom should be carefully comidered bsfore &ring them any endom4 Thwe is some evidence which 8uggeatB that the marginal preference for
leisure over fn~omemay be low w negative wen among those already employed
full time. The Bureau of Labor Btabiatiea dm projects aaonttnliJ rapid exdon in the numbr of women in the labor force, and there is no indication of any
subetantid trend toward earlier d r w n e n t .

~

ment. how eve^; pramurm far reduction of working W to epread
empIoyment would be ~trongif the only alternative amihb1e were
1- of an equivalent number of man-horn through nnemployment.
But contmv~f~y
over the beat use of the available munxa would
serve the Nation poorly if it distracted trtterr tion from the fanhmtsl
importanm of rwhg than one way or mother, snd aaiqg them d,
and if it were made an excuse for inaction or dday in taking the
fundamental memum that mmm that a m conetrudv~urn will be
made of the rwuroee b d n g available. h u m of bhe inhwent
i n ~ n f l s c t ~ eofmthe
~ different parta of the grollg national product
(QNP),an axpamion in any one m h r is likely to bring about axpansion in the 0th- as well, u n l a subject to exceptional reetzictions
(as in wartime). It should be s b e m d that if we do not handle the
aggregate demand problem adequately, the queation ES to prioritits
of ww of our mtma has little dgnibnce. However, if we do handle
the aggregate d p m d problem well, dhrmment affords en unm n W opportunity for
our most pm&ng n 4 n if the
newasmy meeauree m prepared in time.

~~

Structural Problems
It seem entirely possible that aome of the mmt stubborn and
dillicult problems connected with disarmement will be thme arieing
from the concentration of persons and pmductive mources in particular induetries, areas, or vomtional p u p and from the S c u l t i e s
of making the necessary ~ h itfa in employment ~ n m
d u m e utilization.
To be sure, many of thme shifts will be emilq. made through f i e
spontaneous and unaided sction of individuals xsponding to the pull
of free msrket foms. The aucmm of this type of adjustment pmceee
d
l be gratly facilitated if a h i level of demand is maintained.
Them is leee inmntive to move or to retrain if unemployment is
endemic and society derives little benefit from adjustment ~ C E S S B B
which provide job for some people only by taking jobs from othm.
N e v e r t h d ~ even
,
under conditions of full employment opportunity
some of the adjuetrnent pmceasee will be dificult for the individuals,
ampanits, and communitim concerned, and aome Qovernment measura to asgist in this p m x a may be morally jwtilied, economidy
mund, lrnd politidy inevihble.
The employment phaae of the rendjuetrnent may be complicated
by the fsct that the labor force will be expanding with exceptional
rapidity and Iabor displacement through automation may alee be

advancing with great speed. It should be noted that the spmd of
automation may be accelerated as defense firma diversify their
production and apply their advanced tachnology to more tditiond

indwties.
Partidm @oulty may be experienced in finding satbfactory
reemployment for membem of the permanent ddeme force, many of
whom leck traditional cidian industrial skills, are in &Ecult age
group for placement, are accustomed to relatively high sdaw levels
(taking into mount the imputed values of living accommodatiom
provided), or have psraonality orientations not well adapted to
humdrum civilian employment. C ~ a i n&,
on the other hand,
may have outetanding civilian BW,
plw a variety of attituda and
experiencee which may be of epecid ueefulnas in civilian life-rn
e.g., leadership qualities, abilities to endure discomforts, and howledge of foreign arm which might be partidarly useful in international
ecponomio development work.

As for the rank and fie workam in the defame industrim, not
enough is y ~ known
t
about thsir skill and wage levels to make a
reliable appr&al of the diEicultiea they may experience in reemployment. We expect, however, that a fair amount of retraining will be
nemsary, much of it of a fundamental sort involving dwnentsry
education. Policy decisions on the handling of such mattem are
rendered very =cult by the paucity of reliable research in this field.
Some of the experiments in retraining, such w t h m ~
by the Armour
Company and in the Belgian coal mines, have been relatively unsuccemful in the smae of showing a relatively smell number of workem
wdhg and able to ben&t from t h ~ mand the requirement of a large
investment in order to produce a rather small rault. On the other
hand, these conclusions have been criticbed as premature and the
experimenb regarded as incunclwive by some qualzed obctervm who
believe that, by the use of improved teaching methods lrnd measures
to provide incentiva, r e t r d n g programs may aumeed better in the
future.
In the solution of regional problems them is an importmt change
of e m p h h which ha9 developed over the last quarter of a century.
With the mpid rise in the cost of community facilities (housing,maea
education and health facilities, and ao on) relative to the cost of factories and equipment, with the lower proportionate crosts of transportation and power, and with the increased rate of obdlohnce in plant
and equipment, the case bmmes more and more persuasive for aiding
new industry t o enter areas where there is an existing ekilled-labor
farce, rather than s e e h g to move unemployed workers t o where idle

r

manufaoturing facilities are. It seems to be no muidant h t moat of
the European program8 have m~centratedon bringing additional indus- to structurallydepressed areas,rather thsn helping tha workera
to go ahwhere. The new U.S. l@ation on depre~~sed
mesa tdm
the eame spproaah, aad experience gained under it should provide
some useful guidelinw for area readjuetmenf policy under disarmament.
Bemm of the mnsiderabla concentration of defindustry in
partioular IocaIitiaa, tha structural resdjuetment problame of the induatriw and the looditiesl are almost inseparable, and in aome
the readjustment p b l e m a may better be handled in tanrvl of the
industries than of the mw. So fw we have relatively Iittl.8 inform*
tion about the distribution of defense induetrg by region exmpt in
relation to prime contracb and in regard to the Wwt C o ~ t . Our
information about tbe distribution by induatry is somewhat better
and mey be more illuminating.
An induetrid breakdown of the employment impacts ia provided in
Table I. The big concentration of employment apecidy VUInerabIe
to dhmnament w i l l likely be-in very round n u m b 7 0 0 , O O O persons in aircraft, another quarter million each in &pa and O ~ O B
and another 400,000 in radio and other e l e c t r i d equipment and
machinq, plus mother 150,000 in nonelectrical rnwhhq and in
instruments. (Miwile employment is chiefly in h f t but also in
ordnance and electronim.) While another million and a q
ep
sons in other industrim are also likely to be dependent on defenee
demand, this dependence w i l l be for the most part id+&. Also, the
90,000 or so who make the steel which antem dirmtly or indirectly
into defense uam muld very well maintain their existing jobs after diaarmwent if alternative types of damand for quality and special steels
muld be quickly built up.
It ibl of intarest to examine tha extant to which d i t x m t t~rpeaof
demand which might replace defmse demand would provide employment opportunities for workers in t h w particular indwtriea m a t
likely t o s d e r from a loss of defense demand. Thie type of
has been pursued in the hntief-Hoffenberg article, "Economic Consequenm of Diearmament," in the A N 1961 Sch@& Ameka1~.
-ntidy,
this andpis proceeda by the use of what are d d
"trade-off matrica" which show the net change in -demand for the
output of particular industries if a given quantity of d e f m demand
is replaced by an equd quantity of other final demand-pmnal consumption, investment, nondefense Government services, or expo&.
In general, the data prmented suggmt that an expansion of invest-

-
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ment or capital exports would more d y ntiliee the r e l d remurcas than muld other programs.
Coneiderationa of this sort would enpply a more relevant guide to
policy in a crmh disarmament program, where structural pmbiems
wodd be ao severe as rightly to dominate adjustment policy, thsn
in the m e of a deliberate and rnadmhly p a d dissrmment program of the sort here undw mzmideration. Indeed, it ahould be the
aim of policymak~ra,undsr these conditions, to resist the stmng
political preseures which will undoubtedly exist to provide pswticular
opportunities which will reemploy r e l d r8~0ummwith the minimum mount of change in the exieting indnstrial and gmppbia
patterns. Rather, the opportunity ehouid be taken to faciliate the
movement of r89oumm into those mupatiom, industria, and areas
with the biggeat expanaim potential and which promise to make the
largeet long-rn contribution to the achievmant of our nationd go&.
A number of ~pe&c recammendations with reap& to structural
d j u s b m t policia may be drawn from the foregoing andpis of
the problems. It k claw &st of dl that a great deal of what may
have to be done in the event of dimmgment is along the m e linm
as what wodd be highly dmimble right now, dnce &e emnomy is
already s&Iering f m vnrious s t r u e t d msledjuatments rrrieing from
hchuicul chmga, population shifts, paat chmp in the cornpsition
of the defense program, et oetera. Among the pmticular progrsmr
upon wbicb a s t a r t can well be made in the near future may be included :
(a) A atrmgthdng of our system of employment offices so as to
provide a more complete, accurate, and up-to-date central source of
knowledge about job openin@ and job avaihbilities. (A leading
obstacl-d
one not easily overcome--is reluctance of industry to
list job avahbilitiw.)
(b) A strengthening of our un%mploymentinsuranm program with
effort9 to awure adequate minimum atanddm and a -tar
d m ,
of uniformity between S ~ W .
(c) A stronger attempt to devdop a workable retr8:sing scheme,
giving adequate mgnition to the fact that such retraining wiU oftan
require particular attention to dementmy education and even such
mattem aa Iiterwy and elementary arithmetic.
(d) A more ambitious atternlit to explore the poteutid vdue and
mats of a relocation program which may pomibly play 8 coneiderable
role in highly specidid defem cmmunities which either have no
worthwhite potential for nondefense production or which will take

mme conaidewble time to develop altenmativa industrial o p w tunities.
(e) An open-minded ankdemtion should be given to the possible
helpfulness of encouraging defense industry to adopt more l i b d
provisions with respect to severenee pecy, e m by makifin aome
d o w n c e for such progriuns m a Iq$timate mat in ddense cantrack
(In fairness, tbe Government should then consid= expending w
a
r
bendte to ita own defense fom d c i d h mployees.)
(f) Similarly hdpful would be Qovermment attempte to influme
industry to provide more h i m d and flexible pmvigiom permithe vesting of penaion righh, providing adended coverage with r+
spct to group i n m m , horpitdization, and
perqdtee,
and providing employew with company-wide righte of tmrisf~~.
Mwures of this sort would be valuabie in removing &ting oonstsaints on worker mobility.
(g) Careful fittention should be given to the pdbility of B P ~ U T aging defense cantractom ( m b l y by eubeidizing their r e e d on
thme mattam) to begin making studiae as h their p o a ~ ~ e n t
adjustments, including such tbinge as the typea of civilian itema to the
production of which they could copvert with the least =oulty, the
Iikely alternative employment availabilitim in their immdrrte communities, grad- of manpower and kinds of skill now on the staff
which would probably be radundmt in a civilian economy, the new
type of mmmh and development pmgmnfi to which they might hope
f d y contribute, their b c i a l r e q h e n b in the event of a mudden
mu ti on of d d w e contmta, and the typea of financid &stance
which they would h d h&d,
and so forth.
(h) Knowledgmble people from defense industry have a h auggeat4
that W c i a l proviaions in defense contraeta ~w~
defense
industry to begin exploraMry work on r-arcb and development
with mpeot to disarmament inspection requiremanta might be very
helpful not only in developing advme-a plwming and capabilitia in
this field (which could provide a d u l type of o h t p r o w ) but
alee in cr&hg an atmo~phareof w a t e r realism about the whoh
subject of arms control snd disarmament, hdhctly einmurnghgother
type8 of advance prepmation for such s contingmc:y. b t but not
lmt, the war& for technologid b ~ ~ u ingthehfield of inepection is not n M y a hopelees one, and any major achievements
dong this line could aigPificaxltly add to the feasibility of &a~mrunent.'
6 Thus, for example, an intemting researoh idea for the development of a new
method for lwating buried objecta wae not fobwed up by one large d e f e w
contraotor bemuse there was no otEdal indimtion that s u l devi08 if proved
M b l e would flnd a market.
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The Spedal Problem of
Research and Development (R&D)
Reeearch and development may perhapa rate a separate dia*uwion.
One can eonaider tbia peculiarly signiii~~flt
for growth. It is clear,
in any case, that the dispmportionatdy large impact which diearmament may have on R&D ahould be a matter of serious policy
m n m . About hdf of our R&D etFart ie financed by defense
agenue9.
Diaarmment would mrtainly csuae a slackening in the rate of
growth of the R&D effort, and quite posaibly an dmolute decline
in indtwtrhl R&D, if only of a temporaq character. Further,
dthough basic mearch probably would not be too hard hit by disarmament, the alipltion of national military development programs would grqatly redurn the proportion of development work
directed bwmd achieving major breakhoughs. A partial offset
might be provided by the R&Dprogram assooiabd with the inspection md other activiti~of the international control organiae;tlon.
Whir% some reduction in employment of acientiste and engineers
would appear to be unavoidable under these circumstttncea, there is
every IikeIihood that this would prove to be only a shortrun phenomenon. R&D is one of the faatest growing activitia in our
economy, and employment of scientiata and e n g h e m b growing at
a faeter rate than employment of almoet any other occupational
p u p . Although it ia h e that during the late 40% and w l y 50's
increasing defense R$D supwrt was the prime mover, since the
mid-1950's nonmilitary R&D has grown at aa rapid a rate ae has
military R m .
A temporary dadhe in R&D employment, despite the diEcultiw
it would cause to indhiduals and the possible interruptions it might
muse in pmmising research activities, might have the important
oflsetting benefit of facilitating o general review and reaseesmant of
mearch goals and tl. new evaluation of the most promising u e a s for
concentrating future efforts. Along with this muld go s r e a l l ~ t i o n
of researeh resources and personnel to areas where public twd private
potential returns seemed to be the greatest. Some of these areas wilI
require public support if they are to draw the appropriate share of
oitr R&D do&, and new institutiod mangement~for extending
such support may need to be created.
Since our problems in the fields of urban transportation, education,
slld housing are longrun in nature, progrnms of expmded research
in thme fields would undoubtadly merit Government support even

though our chief ahortrun problems hare may not depend so much
on tmhnological breakthroughs as on clearing away politid and
other obstacles t o the application of misting technology. Other a r w
wbere increased research might yield considerable long-term benefits
to society include the exploration of space, the development of atomic
power (especially from fuion pmcmea, if t h w prove workable) and
other unmnventional energy sources, the iodwtrid expIaitlrtion of
our ocean resources, and a renewed attack on the related problm
of cell chemistr~r,aging, and many forms of disease.
Another area of vital political as well as humanitarian impwtmce
which might possibly benefit horn a major orgmhed pmgram of
mearch and development relata to the tachnological obstacleu to
international economic development. Remarch and development in
this area might attack such problems as: development and mgse
production of teaohing mtachinea and related comrnunimtion equip
ment ;solar engines; water pwiiication and other tmhniqum for overearning aridity and restoring desert areas ; new methods of providing
cheap power to remote areas; the elimination of tropid and other
endemic diseases; population control; large batch production and
transportation (perhaps in remodeled surplus nhipping) of eeseseantid
nutritional dements widely deficient in tropical countries; and aye
temetic techniquca for dective use of low-mat labor to mawproduce
s h d w d componenb required for economic development, ~uchaa
roadmaking materids and machinery, simple housing and office buildings, farm irnplernents, power spteme, and even simple macbiue tools
and standard types of industrisl pIanh, and so forth. U.S.contributions to economic development dong these lines would be one d the
ways of fulfilling strong expectations in the underdeveloped countrim
that resomm freed by d i a m e n t would be utilized in part for the
furtherance of international development.
Programs such tu the above would entd a aignXc&llt shift of the
orienhtion of R&D from the present pattern. Scienhb and exlgineem who have devoted their working carem to one field would be
c d e d on to switch to othere. It i not dear, as yet, how d y our
scientific resources are iishifhbfe" to new lines of developing inweat,
but pmumsbly our.centem of higher education at leaat could &wt
some ehift in their instructional emphaais to take account of new
R&D fequirementa and opportunities.
Such long-range and ambitious R&D programs might not only
provide challenging work opportunities for a part of the man@,
engineering, and &entifie resources now employed on defame projmte
but would provide mnatructive outlete for international rivalria,

y not dieappm with the advent of diaarmment
and would a h main& a healthy p m w e on our eduostiod
a p t e m to turn out the i n d flow of ht-rate acientiate and engineem upon which our ultimate W~CCWEin this competition will likely
whiah would d

depend.

"PrImarg fmpaot" reiers to d h a t and indirent data aa m w m d by inputble multiplier &ecC or final demand o f f ~ h .
ou ut malpb but ignorfng
%he wumed reduetiom n expanditwe lo accord with the hypothetical
model of e n d and complete dlearmament aee Table 1x1) arr follows: 8
$17.2 bdm:Btsge 11, $11.8 billion: Bt.as
- I IA, $9.1 biUion; Bt.gs
billion.
Food and kindred produe@ apparel and textlIe mill roducta, leather prod~~ats,
paper and allled pmduota rubber and rubber pmducta, Ember and wood products,
nonme-c
miner& and prmiucta, and mimeUaneous manufaaturing induistriee.
4 Totdo not d
y e ual to sum ofparts bemuse d rounding.
8 Faded
o r c h
good. and d c a a for ndonal defense as percent of
total ~edenPpumb- of gaoda and aervias.
& m a : hatid-Hoffenbmg 1958 mtrix, ad'uahd to 1965. Table p
by READ (lhemA Plognm on Economio Adjustments ta D
b
r
m
m
m
z
d
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TABLE
I1
BTATW LIKELY T O EXPERIENCE A RELATIVELY HEAVY
ECONOMIC 1MPACT FROM DISARMAMENT

.....

.
.

.............
...........
New Medm . . . . . . . . . . .
CalUoda . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conneotiout . . . . . . . . . . .
b r l r ~ n a. . . . . . . . . . . . .
U k h ..
:"'.. , , . . .

'6.2
'%6
a1 7
&3
96

W&gton

.

lao

..........
.............
Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . .

as

Florida

.
.

21
3 5

.

............

ao

..........

20
&5
23

1.9
%5
1 2

..........
..........

.

IYA'PIOBA~IA V B B A O ~

.............

N- ~ ~ p ~ h .l .r .e . . . . . .
&or* . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ahb-

4.2
B. 7
c7
2 8
5 2

28.6

~ o l o ~ e d.o .

Virginia

49
9. 0
87
0.6

.

,...\..a:'

mt~uri
Team . . . .
Mmmhueath
Oklahoma . .

41

.

6 9

22

2 9

22

10. 2
7. 4

a 1.4
1.2

0. S
6 1
28.6

aaa

............

.............
W a t of Columbia . . . . . . .
South Carolina . . . . . . . . . .
Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
10. 8

= aa

Alaska

*Q6
0.4

.

7 6
I& 2

(9

I

I

I'(

I

5

elwhodo oompoaeate, dm& and pwta, 8hipbuUng and m
td *mplo~rmenti.thas.i n d ~ t (ampi
r ~ ~ ~o*.oo~) i. millEmplo
nt in t h w indmtriw and
employment in m u indud= o$%ployment
in h a m covered by ummplopmd i m a m ,
moat of nuch employment is covewed.
and allowand ddim Department of D e i e m w8gm and
M tsrg
InoompMe h a u s e employment in defense industrim excludee employment
whkh, in one or more of the induatrlw, wm not given by State since that would
disoloee information ahut p s r t h h hmi. For the whole country, the amount
excluded from the 8tak-b -State dhtrlbutlon amounted to 13,WW)or 1.1
of the toW employment
&or dafinduatria. Pm an i o d i v k d u ~ ~ ~
ai mum, the exdudon might be much more Important.
4 Between sero and 1 pemnt.
a hxi than of 1 pemnt.
*Not 8vsIlable.

& !u&ion.
id

c !
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1961, p. f 8. Table prepared by

READ.
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TAB^ IZI
MODEL OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE IlfBAEMAMENT

,.

i

U.8.

-8b-d

r

*

--

-

r n ~~ 1~~ ~?n i r0 p! t u! m E
~
- n
U*& m#nm
m a o n m l . . . . . . . . . . .
~ a n d m a l n ~ o l t .
-ent
(Ins mwu& & &
velwmalt)

...

.........
Mf&
...........
Mwfwy spaoe . . . . . . . .
me . . . . . . . . . . . .
0
t
h............
camtru&on . . . . . . . . . .
lllroraft...........

MnlW

-QB

M i l k t y AE(1
Civil d a h m =

...
.........

.........
...

U.8. Dale-Total.

U.8. o w ~ u t i o b
n inferaatdod 4
Inapeotion

...........
..........

MOB
foroee
Ihhrmnt foross
J r l d i M l t ddntldmtim flme

........

tfons

............

U,0.aontribu&Tdal.

.

TOTAL D.I. E X P E N X ) m I ON BEOUIUTY PBOClRAM8.

......

Assdated pro&t'am€i
M M A . . . .

a*

AEC.

.........

.........

Ammdated pro@-6-Total.

GRAND TOTAL.

....

IMsarmamentmmamphna aminkmdedto be ~
o
o
~ w f nt h h t
r m .
r D e f e m expenditureedmatee medeb ELEAf)basdon Bureau ofthe
1961); George ~ W
Budget* ..otiona, publiehd in 8p&d &wd~(h.
un u&manuecri&
"~~ ADttvitiea in Southern CWfornisinthe 1QWe";

u.a p

an$ corddatial ind80a While a number of the
eathiaka in Table XI1 .bvolve oontmvmbl
asriumption of the 'Bureau of the Budget projections, published 19 8 p d Budy
Jan. IQBl),and the m t i m a h for later yeam are b m d on the m m p t i o n that
In a @od of dhrmament the United 8tates would he glsd to adopt ang
meamurn of a defdefe o~~
whfch would Inorasw ita IlysiEal ~ecurityand
nut ba incompsklble alth the disarmament
cement. &ey might Im viewed
as a dsainNa form of hnranss agalmt %
-e
breakdms h tbp dllrmaulant
,especially during a perid W o r e dl nations were arhci athg. Nor
E K u o b a proam r4.w the deterrent povsr d the %aoa Pora; on t~
contrary it alone could render the exerob of suah power oredible.
'The U.8. mntribution ta t
L international wrntrol organization and the
Pegoe For- L8 888tund b mer one-third of total con@ but no oharge 3a mum&
tor
wap- m
taansimmt~to the interpadond o o n b l organiaation
or the Peaoe Fom.
&hathan $60 million.
4 Ekaludhg revolving h d .

B

